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BREWER V. WEST IRONDEQUOIT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
212 F.3D 738 (21 CIR. 2000)
FACTS
Jessica Haak is a fourth grader' who wanted to attend a better school. She
applied to the Urban-Suburban Interdistrict Transfer Program ("the Program")
so she could transfer from the urban Rochester (New York) City School
District, where she resided, to the neighboring suburban Irondequoit District.
2
The Program denied Jessica's transfer because she is white and therefore did
not meet the Program's definition of a minority student.
Six New York school districts, including Rochester City and Irondequoit,
voluntarily participate in this Program to achieve the goal of reduced racial
isolation within their boundaries. 3 The Program allows only minority students
to transfer from schools in the urban districts to suburban districts, which are
typically wealthy and white. Only non-minority students may transfer from
suburban schools to the urban districts, including the Rochester District.4 The
Program began in 1965 "to reduce, prevent and eliminate minority group
isolation in the schools of Rochester and Monroe County through voluntary
desegregation."5  Although Program documents identify its goals as,
"Reducing Minority Group Isolation; Encouraging Intercultural Learning;
Promoting Academic Excellence; [and] Fostering Responsible Civic
Leadership," the District Court found that "the main purpose of the Program
is to reduce what is described as 'racial isolation' within the population of the
participating school districts."'6
According to New York Education Law Regulations ("the Regulations")
"racial isolation" exists when "a school or school district enrollment consists
of a predominant number or percentage of students of a particular racial/ethnic
group."7 The Regulations define a "minority pupil" as a student "who is of
Black or Hispanic origin or is a member of another racial minority group that
historically has been the subject of discrimination."' Thus, to participate in the
exchange program, districts must show that the Program "will reduce racial
isolation by transferring minority pupils, nonminority pupils or both on a
voluntary basis between participating urban and suburban districts."9 Despite
the stated goal of reducing racial isolation, no reference to the student's race
1. Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central Sch. DisL, 212 F.3d 738, 741 (2nd Cir. 2000).
2. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 741.
3. 212 F.3d at 741.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 742.
6. Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 621 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
7. N.Y. CoMP. CoDEs R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 175.24(a)(2) (1999).
8. N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 175.24(a)(1) (1999).
9. N.Y. CoMP. CoDES R.&REGS. tit. 8, § 175.24(c)(1) (1999).
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existed in the Program's materials, application, acknowledgment letter, or
brochures."
In 1998, the Irondequoit School District accepted Jessica Haak into the
Program and sent her a letter of acceptance, even after the school's assistant
principal realized that Jessica was white. 1 Nevertheless, before Jessica
completed her transfer, another school administrator questioned her minority
status after she had met Jessica and verified her race as "Caucasian/White" in
the Rochester District Records. 2  The school then revoked Jessica's
acceptance to the Program because she was not a minority. 3
Jessica Haak moved for a preliminary injunction to permit her transfer.'
4
Haak claimed that the withdrawal of her transfer violated her rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment,' 5 and constituted illegal discrimination under federal 6
and state 7 law.' The district court granted the injunction and ordered Haak's
transfer, stating that to deny her transfer because she is not a minority student
would violate her equal protection rights."' The district court used strict
scrutiny analysis because the Program treated similarly situated individuals
differently on the basis of racial classification.' To withstand this level of
judicial scrutiny, the school district must identify a compelling state interest
and prove that the transfer policy was narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.2' The court doubted that the Program could demonstrate a compelling
state interest and further reasoned that, even with a compelling state interest,
the racial classification used in the Program was not sufficiently tailored to
pass constitutional muster.22
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction granting Haak's transfer and remanded the case for a
10. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 742.
11. Id. at 743.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Brewer v. West lronedequoit Central Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 634 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
15. The Fourteenth Amendment states, in part, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
17. N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3201 (McKinney 1995).
18. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 741.
19. Brewer, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 632-633.
20. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 745.
21. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
22. Brewer, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 633.
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trial on the merits.2a The court stated that Haak had not met the requisite
heightened standard necessary for a mandatory preliminary injunction.2
ANALYSIS
The Court of Appeals reviewed the preliminary injunction de novo, and
examined the written record for an abuse of discretion.25 The court noted that
in most circumstances, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show
both irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits to succeed.
26
The Court of Appeals, however, applied a significantly higher standard that
requires a "clear" or "substantial" showing of a likelihood of success.27 This
higher standard applies whenever the injunction sought would be "mandatory"
and would "provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought, and that
relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the
merits."'  The injunction at issue was mandatory for two reasons. First, it
would allow Haak to transfer to the school of her choice, which she could not
do except through the Program.29 Second, while Haak contended she was only
attacking the Program as it applied to her, "it is clear that the survival of the
Program is at stake." 3 The court stated that if school districts allowed non-
minority students such as Haak to transfer, the Program would no longer work
toward reducing racial isolation and would lose its funding.3' Thus, because
the injunction would allow Haak to transfer, thereby altering the status quo and
providing her with all of the relief sought, it was properly characterized as
mandatory.32
The Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff demonstrated irreparable
injury by alleging that the school district deprived her of a constitutional
right.3 In turning to the likelihood of Haak's potential success on the merits,
the court applied strict scrutiny analysis, as is required when reviewing
government classifications based on race.34 To survive this most stringent
23. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 743.
24. 212 F.3d at743.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Forest City Daly Hous., Inc. v. Town of North Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 149 (2d
Cir. 1999)).
27. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 744.
28. Id. (quoting Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)).
29. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 744.
30. Id. at 744.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 745.
34. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225-226 (1995).
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review, the challenged classification must serve a compelling governmental
interest and be narrowly tailored to further that interest.
35
The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that the central purpose
of the program was to reduce racial isolation.36 The district court, however,
made no findings as to whether racial isolation even existed in participating
school districts.37 On appeal, the defendants contended that de facto
segregation was present, but claimed that they had not developed the argument
in the lower court because the plaintiff had not contested the issue.3' The
defendants argued that plaintiff, in effect, conceded that reducing racial
isolation was a compelling state interest,39 and instead chose to argue that the
Program was overbroad.
The Court of Appeals could not conclude that the plaintiff met her burden
to demonstrate a clear likelihood of success on the merits because a substantial
question existed as to whether de facto segregation in fact existed in the
participating school districts.' The court believed that both parties should be
given an opportunity to address this factual issue during a trial on the merits."
The Court of Appeals further determined that serious questions existed as to
whether the goal of reducing racial isolation was a compelling government
interest.42
The Program was enacted in 1965 to counter racial segregation in the
county schools, which had resulted from the public school policy that each
student has only the right to attend the school in the district in which he or she
lives.43 This policy, compounded with segregated living patterns, created a
pattern of de facto segregation." The court noted that the Program may be
justified if, in fact, de facto segregation exists and the alleviation of that racial
isolation is a compelling state interest.4"
In Parent Association of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach
46
(Andrew Jackson II), the Court of Appeals explicitly stated that reducing de
facto segregation served a compelling government interest.47 Andrew Jackson
35. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 745.










46. Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 738 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1984) (Andrew
Jackson H).
47. Andrew Jackson II, 738 F.2d at 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1984). See also Parent Ass'n. of Andrew
Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 712-713 (2d. Cir. 1979) (Andrew Jackson 1) (affirming a
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High School (New York) developed a plan that permitted both white and
minority students to transfer out with certain limitations." Minority students
could transfer to schools in which white students exceeded fifty percent of the
student population, and white students could transfer to schools with less than
fifty percent white students.4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held in Parent
Association ofAndrew Jackson High School v. Ambach50 (Andrew Jackson 1)
that the school board's "goal of ensuring the continuation of relatively
integrated schools for the maximum number of students... survived strict
scrutiny as matter of law."5' Despite the strong similarities between the
Andrew Jackson decisions and the Haak case, the parties neglected to discuss
this precedent in the district court.52 The Court of Appeals determined that
because the district court did not distinguish the Andrew Jackson precedent,
it was bound in this case by the previous decision that reducing racial isolation
and de facto segregation could be a compelling state interest.53 Consequently,
the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had not clearly demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits, because a compelling state interest may
exist in a program with the goal of reducing racial isolation and de facto
segregation.54 The court based its conclusions on: "(1) the binding authority
of the Andrew Jackson cases; (2) the absence of a Supreme Court decision
dealing with permissible race-based justifications in the educational context;
and (3) the lack of a clear majority from the Supreme Court regarding
permissible justifications for race-based classifications generally.-
55
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test is that the action be
narrowly tailored to achieve the stated government interest.56 While the
district court found that the Program was not narrowly tailored to the alleged
interests at stake, the Court of Appeals believed that the record was insufficient
to make such a conclusion.57 The Court of Appeals determined that the proper
question for the district court was "whether the Program is narrowly tailored
to achieve its primary goal of reducing racial isolation resulting from de facto
district court's finding that what panel labeled de facto segregation of the school "resulted from population
changes" in the surrounding neighborhoods).
48. Andrew Jackson II, 738 F.2d at 577.
49. Id.
50. Parent Ass'n. of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d. Cir. 1979) (Andrew
Jackson I).
51. Andrew Jackson 1 598 F.2d at 717-720.
52. Brewer, 212 F.3d at 749.
53. 212 F3d at 749.
54. Id. at 753.
55. Id. at 752.
56. id. at 745.
57. Id. at 752.
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segregation.""8 If reducing racial isolation is a constitutionally permissible
goal, as was found in the Andrew Jackson cases, then the most effective means
of achieving that goal would be to make decisions based on race. 59 Given the
plaintiff's substantial burden in seeking the mandatory injunction, the Court
of Appeals decided that the district court must again examine the Program,
first to determine whether the goal of reducing racial isolation is compelling
and then to determine whether the Program is narrowly tailored to achieve that
objective.' The Court therefore vacated the preliminary injunction of the
district court and remanded the case to the district court.6'
Judge Parker concurred with the majority opinion and agreed that the
injunction should be vacated. 2 In his concurrence, however, he expressed
serious reservations about the continued existence of the Program. 63 The
Program has operated for 35 years during which the minority pupil population
in the Rochester City School District has risen from 25.6 percent to 80
percent.( The number of minority students transferring according to the
Program in the 1998-1999 school year was approximately 580, while only 29
white students had transferred from the suburban schools to the Rochester
District.6 The total enrollment of the Rochester District is close to 36,000.
66
Judge Parker noted that the Program had, at best, a negligible impact in
reducing the racial isolation of the school populations. 67 Thus, even if at its
inception the Program served a compelling government interest, it is difficult
to see how the interest remains justified in light of the limited effect of the
Program.68 Judge Parker concluded that the Program may no longer be a
compelling government interest and the constitutionality of its existence
should be questioned.69 Judge Miner dissented, finding that "[w]hen it is
apparent as it is here that the narrow tailoring requirement of the strict scrutiny
test is unfulfilled, a preliminary injunction must issue."70
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 753.
61. Id.
62. Brewer, 212 F.3d 738, 755 (Parker, L, concurring).
63. id. at 755 (Parker, J., concurring).
64. Id. (Parker, J., concurring).
65. id. (Parker, J., concurring).
66. Id. (Parker, ., concurring).
67. Id. (Parker, J., concurring).
68. Id. (Parker, J., concurring).
69. Id. (Parker, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 758 (Miner, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct in
rejecting the plaintiffs' request for a mandatory injunction. In one sense,
Jessica's hopes of transferring were doomed from the beginning. The
injunction ordering Jessica Haak's transfer acted contrary to the stated goals
of the Program. If the Court of Appeals upheld the injunction, the Program
would have lost its financial support and ceased to operate, leaving Jessica
without funding with which to transfer. The only way that Jessica's transfer
could have been allowed was if the Court of Appeals found the Program
unconstitutional. With such an outcome, however, there would remain no
foundation on which to base her transfer. It is for this reason that the plaintiff
could not show a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits and,
as such, Jessica's injunction could not have been granted.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a
clear likelihood of success on the merits. Racial classification may be justified
if a compelling state interest is found in reducing racial isolation and de facto
segregation. By remanding the case, the Court of Appeals allows for the
continued use of programs to combat the racial isolation discussed in the case.
The holding is important because it not only recognizes that reducing de facto
segregation and racial isolation may be a compelling government interest, but
further leaves open the possibility for use of race qualifications in such
instances of compelling government interest.
Reducing racial isolation can be a compelling government interest
sufficient to surpass equal protection claims. While reducing de facto
segregation and increasing the diversity of the classroom is important, it seems
the true motivation for inner city students to transfer is an opportunity for a
better education. Starting with the premise that it is unconstitutional to treat
equals as unequals, it seems clear that the Program is in violation. A poor
black student and a poor white student are equally disadvantaged,
economically and educationally, by living in the inner-city. To allow one to
transfer out of the school district and not the other treats two similarly situated
individuals differently. This is a clear violation of equal protection. The
Program should be structured so that an economically disadvantaged person
is allowed to transfer to a better schooling environment regardless of race.
This type of program however would only be useful if the goal was to provide
better educational opportunities for inner-city students. The goal here is to
reduce racial isolation, which necessarily requires a consideration of race.
On closer inspection, however, it seems that a poor white and a poor black
are not similarly situated. A poor black suffers the same level of economic
20011
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poverty but suffers an additional handicap solely by virtue of race. The
historical discrimination and lingering social stigma associated may be
crippling, especially when starting from an economically disadvantaged
position. This is not to say that inner-city whites do not also need educational
assistance and better schooling, only that inner-city blacks suffer more than
just economic depression.
Finally, it does not seem entirely appropriate for race to be the sole
deciding characteristic in a program; however when race coincides with a
greater societal problem such as racial isolation, such qualification may be
necessary.
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